We propose a state-stewardship theory competing with the traditional agency theory to explain the corporate governance model and executive compensation policy in China. Under China's highly politically-oriented institutional environment, Chinese managers (business elites) are not just professional managers but also government officials (political elites) directly appointed -even in 'private' firms -by the state. Consequently, they do not face inherent conflicts of interest with the state, but are expected to act as responsible 'stewards' of the state. This state-steward relationship is amplified when more state-owned shares are sold to the market. We test the state-stewardship theory on all non-financial listed firms in China for the period 2001 to 2011. Consistent with our conjectures, we find that Chinese managers are paid much less than their international counterparts and that remuneration is lower in firms with larger state-ownership or stronger (ultimate) state-control. Also, Chinese managers seem to be remunerated not for maximizing equity value but for increasing the value of the state-owned assets. The board of directors only plays a symbolic role; it does not have much influence in terms of advice or supervision and does not seem to regulate managerial pay. Managerial duality does not seem to grant the general manager more power in influencing his own remuneration. Furthermore, managers' remuneration is not linked to competence and personal traits, but rather to their political connections and prestige, and to the contribution that their firms make to the local, regional, or national (macro-)economic targets and hence the (local) officials' political achievements. Most of the above effects are stronger in the pre-2006 period, because after the split-share reform of 2006, companies became more market-oriented though state influence still prevails. The results remain robust when we control for endogeneity, measurement errors, outlier effects, and sector and regional differences.
I. Introduction
In 2010, Jiangling Motors, one of China's biggest commercial vehicle companies, achieved sales revenues of over $2.5 billion following strong growth. Its CEO, York Chen, received an annual total compensation of $375,000, at par with his 2009 pay (but higher than that of any other CEO in this sector). In marked contrast, Dieters Zetsche, the CEO of the European automobile giant Daimler AG, earned €8.7 million euro ($12 million), twice his pay in 2009 and more than 30 times Chen's salary. This discrepancy in pay is even larger when one considers Ford 's CEO Allan Mulally, who received $26.5 million in 2010, 48% more than 2009 (Bloomberg, April 1, 2011) . The above example is not a unique case. Conyon and He (2011) document that the executive pay (salary and bonus) of US top managers is about seventeen times higher than that in China, even after controlling for economic and governance factors.
When stock options and equity compensation are considered, the difference augments to approximately 42 times.
Why do such huge differences in remuneration between China and the US (and Europe and Japan) exist? Why are Chinese top managers who lead large, internationally diversified firms that also operate in western economies willing to accept a comparatively slim income? Can we apply the western compensation models to developing countries and economies with strong state involvement?
The majority of the extant literature resorts to agency theory to explain executive compensation policies (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Garen, 1994; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) . The interests of the managers (the agent) and shareholders (the principal) can be in conflict, and agency problems may arise if managers abuse their power, for instance, by awarding themselves generous pay packages neither justified by high managerial skills nor related to a meaningful contribution to the firm's performance.
Consequently, the compensation scheme should be designed in such a way as to elicit effort from the management while avoiding the above conflicts of interest (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck, 2004) . However, is this agency logic valid for emerging economies? The answer is negative because in countries in political and institutional transition such as China, the state and the political authorities own significant equity stakes (and their political influence extends beyond ownership). The use of non-cash compensation is very rare and, if it is used at all, disclosure is incomplete, but perquisite consumption may be more prevalent (Adithipyangkul, Alon, and Zhang, 2011) .
2 Business activities are heavily influenced by the government and other political powers through the government's deliberate policy to transfer resources, as well as the vast presence of government ownership and political connection of firms. In Russia, for example, politically-connected firms represent over 85 percent of the market capitalization (Shleifer, 1998; Faccio, 2006) . It is reasonable to believe that such strong political influence on business activities results in relatively less market-based managerial compensation schemes.
Several papers have examined executive compensation in China (e.g., Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006; Chen, Liu, and Li, 2010; Conyon and He, 2011; Chen, Ezzamel, and Cai, 2011) , but their focus was mainly on testing western corporate governance theories in the Chinese context. These include agency theory which propounds a pay-performance sensitivity analysis (Murphy, 1985) , and the managerial power conjectures (Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002; Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia, 2002) which argue that managers' influence enables them to extract rents through excessive pay. Unsurprisingly, the validity of the agency theory in Chinese business is weak. An alternative theoretical framework incorporating the broader political and institutional determinants of China's corporate governance system is lacking. It is also important to take an evolutionary perspective as significant shifts of state powers in the economy and businesses have arisen over the last decade. Therefore, in the context of remuneration contracting in China, two main research questions emerge: (1) What roles (other than 'agents') do managers play and how are they remunerated? (2) How do such roles and remuneration evolve over time?
In this paper, we confirm that the level and structure of Chinese executive compensation does not tie in with the traditional principal-agent relationship in which the manager's compensation is linked to equity-based returns (stock returns, return on equity, Tobin's Q, etc). The low remuneration of Chinese managers (relative to their international peers) is prevalent in firms with stronger state control, and when self-dealing opportunities are larger. Managers are also rewarded more for maximizing the value of state-owned assets (rather than for maximizing shareholder value). Furthermore, their remuneration is not closely linked to ability or personality, but to their political connections and prestige, as well as to their firms' contribution to the local officials' political goals. All these effects have evolved over time, whereby especially the major privatization effort of 2006 (the split-share structure reform) has had a big impact on the roles of managers and their remuneration contracts. In our analysis, we control for potential endogeneity issues, measurement errors, outlier effects, and we distinguish between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and so-called 'private' companies by regional development.
Our work makes the following contributions. First, as the traditional agency theory is not able to explain the level, composition, and evolution of executive compensation in China (e.g., Firth et al. , 2006 Firth et al. , , 2007 Conyon and He, 2011) , we focus on state influence and managers' political connections and formulate a state-stewardship theory for Chinese corporations. This institutional perspective has stronger explanatory power as it incorporates the organizing principle, incentive structures, and enforcement mechanism of firms and managers within China's authoritarian political system after the economic reform and incomplete privatization. Second, we take an evolutionary perspective to study how the Chinese state controls the economy -by means of ownership stakes and stewardship relations with the 2006 split-share reform as a watershed. Such evolution also implies a shift of wealth from the state (the government) to the nation (the private citizens), while the authoritarian state still maintains tight control over (corporate) employees (Xu, 2011) . Third, the state-manager relationship has broader implications for China's economic and political development. Economic reform without reforming the human resources policies at the executive level enables the autocratic state to exert political power on corporate decision making, so as to ensure that firms' business activities fulfill the state's political objectives. Therefore, this study also has some welfare implications.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses China's institutional background and the typical characteristics of Chinese corporate governance and executive compensation practices.
Embedded in this institutional background, Section III develops the state-stewardship theory and its building blocks. Section IV develops five sets of testable conjectures, and Section IV describes the data and outlines the empirical model. Section VI provides the empirical results and robustness checks.
Section VII concludes with a discussion on the relationship between the state-elites and private citizens under our state-stewardship theory.
II. Institutional Background

Privatization and the split-share structure reform
China adopted the former Soviet Union's socialist ideology and turned into a centralized command economy ruled by the Communist Party in 1949. All firms were state-owned, with production and operations strictly following state orders. When China started its economic reform in 1978, one of the key elements was the privatization (or 'corporatization' (Clarke, 2003) ) of the formerly state-owned enterprises. Two stock exchanges, in Shanghai and Shenzhen, were established in 1990. Listed companies became increasingly accountable to shareholders (in addition to the state). The managerial resource allocation system has been improved since the modern industrial and corporate reforms were initiated in 1978 and continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s Naughton, 1994, 1995) . Initially a dual share structure was established for all listed companies: approximately two-thirds of domestically listed shares (A-shares) were not tradable on the market and were usually owned by the government and state agencies, which hindered the privatization process considerably. In April 2005
(effective from 2006), the Chinese government initiated the split-share structure reform of turning non-tradable shares into tradable ones (called the share issue privatization (SIP)) for all listed domestic firms. More than 1,400 listed companies could 'gradually' convert their tradable shares 3 . Holders of non-tradable shares 4 compensated holders of tradable shares in each individual firm for about three shares per 10 shares on average so as to make the non-tradable shares tradable through negotiated compensation plans which differed from firm to firm. All Chinese listed companies completed their negotiations by the end of 2008, and all of their restricted shares became fully tradable by the end of 2011. Even after the split-share structural reform, the state is still playing a major role in regulating companies' strategic-decision making, developing corporate governance regulation, and setting executive compensation schemes through retaining the executive-level employees as state-appointees, maintaining a stake in privatized firms, and supervision through the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
In many firms, especially those within the electronic, automobile manufacturing, steel, natural resource exploitation and extraction industries, the state has kept majority control and foreign share stakes are restricted; the managers, the board's chairperson, the political secretary of the firm (the Communist Party representative), and other managers are usually directly appointed by the state. As a consequence, corporate governance and executive compensation contracting in China's state-oriented economy exhibit unique patterns not present in Western economies. The evolution in state ownership over our sample period for different industries is exhibited in Figure 1 . Figure 1a shows the evolution of the state ownership in the top five industries ranked by market capitalization. Figure 1b 
Corporate governance structure after privatization
China's corporate governance structure has been set up since the privatization in the early 1990s 5 and is based on western governance codes and corporate law, although China's Socialist-featured company law and related codes (in particular, the CSRC Codes) comprise some singularities. For instance, the Chinese corporate board structure combines some aspects of the Anglo-American one-tier board model and the German two-tier one. In general, executive directors and non-executive directors of US and UK firms man one organizational body which is chaired by the CEO (as is frequently the case in the US) or not (in the UK). Such one-tier boards also comprise audit, remuneration and nomination committees. In contrast, firms from German legal origin countries such as Austria, Germany, and Japan, separate the executive and supervisory boards (the latter then only consists of non-executive directors with advisory and monitoring roles who represent shareholders and employees). China's board structure is loosely based on the two-tier structure, but in practice more like a muddled one-tier Anglo-American board (IIF, 2006 ) whereby the board 6 (i) consists of several independent directors (CSRC requires the independent director ratio of the board to be above 1/3), (ii) is the main decision-making authority within the firm, and (iii) oversees and aids management practice. In practice, the Chinese supervisory board has only a symbolic function and hence does not play an effective governance role (Tam, 2002; Tenev and Zhang, 2002 6 Henceforth, when we mention the 'board', we refer to the board of directors consisting of both executive and non-executive directors, but not the supervisory board. 7 The main difference and connections between the supervisory board and the party committee is that the supervisory board is usually chaired by an employee representative from the All China Federation of Trade Unions (China's only government-sanctioned union), and among the other board members is typically an official from the company's internal party committee and at least one other person elected by shareholders. Company directors and other senior managers are not allowed to sit on the board of supervisors.
phenomenon which is usually termed as managerial duality. Figure 2 illustrates the unique internal governance structure of Chinese companies (especially SOEs).
[Insert Figure 2 about Here]
Evolution of executive compensation
The pervasive privatization and corporate governance reform has dramatically changed executive remuneration schemes in many Chinese companies that transitioned from state firms to market-oriented firms. Before the early 1980s, Chinese firms were embedded in the centralized planning whereby managers were responsible for meeting output targets, and their compensation was centrally determined
and not based on performance (Chow, 1992) . SOE managers were merely representatives of the government. More specifically, they were bureaucrats appointed directly by the party's Organization Department (central personnel department) (Cao, Lemmon, Pan, Qian, and Tian, 2011) . During that period, all profits realized by SOEs were to be repatriated to the government, leaving no incentives for managers. Managerial pay was based on the highly structured civil service pay scale which reflected only the differences in region, industry, and seniority in the civil service system, rather than performance.
Moreover, under the influence of the communist tenets advocating similarity in pay across all ranks of members of society, cash bonuses were divided equally among the members of the group, making them more similar to wage supplements than to real bonuses. In addition to the cash compensation, managers are also compensated through 'social wages' (pension and retirement benefits, and various social insurance contracts such as health care and housing allowance) and non-pecuniary incentives (recognition and honors) (Chow, 1992) . During the 1980s, sweeping changes in the regulatory environment ushered in a new era of more liberalized compensation schemes, and the Chinese government implemented several reforms to modernize executive compensation practices: in the first phase of the reform (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , various profit retention schemes were introduced in that output targets were replaced by output quota and output in excess of the specified quota could be sold on the market and the firms could retain part of the profits. In the second phase, starting at the end of 1984, such profit remittances were replaced by a profit tax rate of 55%, and the after-tax profit could be used for investment, R&D, and bonuses and benefits for employees. In the third phase (after 1985) , contractual responsibility systems were implemented, whereby centralized planning was replaced by contracts between the SOEs and their supervisory bodies. Such contracts made executives personally responsible, which increased the executive compensation up to 10-12 times that of an average worker. Figure 3 conceptually illustrates the composition of executive compensation in China.
[Insert Figure 3 about Here]
Given the institutional background of China, we elaborate on a state-stewardship theory in the next section to explain the determinants and evolution of remuneration of China's corporate executives.
III. A State-stewardship Theory for China
Since the ground-breaking work by Donaldson and Davis (1991) , scholars have resorted to the stewardship theory of management as a basis for managers' and shareholders' philosophical alignment.
This theory, a sociological and psychological approach to governance, hinges on the assumption that executives feel a strong sense of attachment to and psychological ownership of their firm, and hence are more likely to behave as stewards. This perspective stands in marked contrast with agency theory in which managers are assumed to act in their own interest at the expense of shareholders. Higher levels of 'psychic income' (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo, 1997) should make such 'organizationally centered' executives (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson 1997: 25) accept lower cash compensation to continue working in the organization. In the economics and finance literature, the stewardship theory has never been regarded as a valid alternative to agency theory, has not lead to practical managerial decision rules, and has gained little empirical support. However, we adjust this stewardship concept to the Chinese context, and use this term to describe the fact that in principle Chinese managers are (required to be) accountable to the state. Chinese managers are usually appointed by the state, and maintain close political connections with the government. As a result they actually act like the stewards of the state, and work towards fulfilling both the economic objectives of the firm and the political ones of the state. We illustrate this state-stewardship concept from three angles: (a) the organizing principles of the company, (b) the incentive structures of the manager, and (c) the enforcement mechanisms imposed by the state.
(a) In terms of the organizing principle, the state is involved in every level of activity of the firm, both political and economical. The political organizing principle requires that firms' business activities be fundamentally state-driven, be aligned with goals such as safeguarding the political power/social demand, and be conform to the ideological requirements. The economic organizing principle requires that firms' business activities achieve economic growth in state-related sectors' and maintain some degree of monopoly power in some 'national strategic industries'.
(b) The incentive structures for state-appointed (or state-influenced) managers are based on a political cadre promotion system with different hierarchical levels. Each level of the cadre is equipped with different set of benefits, but by nature, all are entitled as government officers to enjoy miscellaneous political and economic types of rewards. For instance, under the career promotion system, a manager who wants to secure his job and ensure promotion has to show loyalty to the party.
(c) The enforcement mechanisms rely on the coercive power of the state to punish the stewards when they violate the state's will or when their behavior and performance are perceived as unsatisfactory. The punishment comprises lowering a SOE manager's rank (seniority) in the civil service hierarchy or removing a manager from his political cadre position. Moreover, the government regularly rotates its officers and state-appointed managers between political and corporate positions to make sure that they are absolutely loyal to the government (the party).
This state-stewardship concept is not static but has evolved over the past 2 decades. The massive privatization has reformed the ownership of Chinese enterprises, transiting from entirely state-owned to semi-state owned or privately owned, especially after the split-share structure reform. Correspondingly, the form of control by the Communist-Party-led state has transited from pure state-ownership to state-stewardship. We argue that the reforms only privatized the ownership structure and composition but did not really reform the human resources policies at the managerial level. To maintain its control legitimacy, the state boosts the economy through privatization (which leads to more efficient allocation of resources and improves production efficiency), and controls the economy through maintaining its stewardship system within firms to carry out its political objectives. (Or why is Chinese compensation so low?) We have seen above that the state puts more emphasis on political and macroeconomic objectives rather than on firm profitability. Consequently, a manager's incentive structure may be geared towards the former objectives. As state's stewards, Chinese managers face the threat of punishment for lack of political loyalty (dismissal) but also are offered lower firm-based pecuniary rewards, and lower pay-for-corporate performance. The prevailing presence of state ownership and state control in Chinese firms is the legacy of China's incomplete privatization. Especially for the largest companies and companies in key industries such as oil and telecommunication, the state wants to retain its absolute control in 'national strategic industries' ('retain the large'). Higher state ownership is usually associated with various non-pecuniary benefits for the management such as higher prestige, stronger political cadre promotion incentives, but also with stronger coercive state influence, and stronger concern for public criticism.
Prestige is immensely important in Chinese (and most Asian) cultures and prestige-driven motivation usually surpasses pecuniary-induced motivation. People at the higher levels of the political and social hierarchies are usually overwhelmingly respected, often regardless of their moral standards and abilities. This is partly a legacy of the hierarchical monarchical society which was prevalent in China for thousands of years. More recently, due to the partial privatization, state's steward-managers receive rewards to fulfill the political objectives not in the form of cash compensation but instead of privileges obtained through the promotion channel and opportunities to extract private benefits from the investors (Hung, Wong, and Zhang, 2012 (Johnson, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 2000) and China (Jiang, Lee, Yeung, 2010) .
For example, the latter study documents that during the period 1996-2006, the management siphoned tens of billions of RMB from listed firms by means of inter-corporate loans to blockholders. Information on such inter-corporate loans is publically available but the loans do not require a 'fair value' test.
Furthermore, these loans were not made as part of the firms' normal course of business, did not even accrue interest, and even when some interest was accrued, neither the interest nor the principal were typically ever paid back. It is expected that the managers of the firms where this type of tunneling was rampant, personally benefited through colluding with dominant shareholders (often even state authorities or agencies). Jiang et al. (2010) argue that China is an environment highly conducive to tunneling behavior. 8 They also show that this practice was not uncommon, and more so in local-government controlled firms than for firm controlled by the central-government. Inter-corporate loans were booked as 'other receivables' on the balance sheet. From an agency perspective, managerial pay should be linked to performance that maximizes shareholder value, whereas from a state-stewardship view, a manager is not motivated much by pecuniary rewards but more so by political objectives, which translates into political promotions and prestige. To measure performance, we use the return on assets (ROA) which measures the net income to the assets controlled by the state, and Tobin's Q, which captures the market-based return to the shareholder's equity. If there is indeed a discrepancy between being responsible to the state and not to the shareholders, we would observe that managerial compensation is more related to the ROA but less to Tobin's Q. Since the split-share structure reform of 2006 when most non-tradable shares were sold to the market as tradable equity and corporate governance became more market-oriented, we expect that the increase in market-orientation is reflected in the stronger pay for market-based performance.
Therefore,
C2. The managerial compensation in China is significantly positively correlated with the return on assets, but not with the market-based return (e.g., Tobin's Q) in the pre-2006 period. In the subsequent period, we expect that the former relation is attenuated and that pay is significantly
positively related to the market-based return.
Political connections and managerial backgrounds
If corporate performance in China is a benchmark of lesser importance for managerial pay, what are the main corporate characteristics and managerial traits that are related to higher remuneration? Let us first examine whether pay is related to a manager's personality, ability, and political-connections. If the state-stewardship concept is valid, we expect managers not to be rewarded for their real abilities to generate financial returns, but to their connectedness to the state and politicians, and to their degree of compliance to the state order. China is notable for being an environment where friendly connections with government officials can pave the way through a bureaucratic labyrinth (Wall Street Journal, September 6, 2011) , even easing access to capital that is scarce for pure private-sector enterprises (Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007) . Furthermore, a political background increases one's prestige in China. Managers of listed firms who are politically connected are perceived to belong to both the business and political elites which reflects their achievements and level in the social hierarchy of the Chinese society. Therefore, one could conjecture that managers are paid in line with their hierarchical status. As the direct ownership stakes in the hands of the state have decreased since the (partial) privatization, the importance of state control through political connections has increased, which may be reflected in higher pay for connectedness (especially since 2006).
C3a. Politically connected managers receive higher compensation. This relation is stronger in the post-2006 period.
Under the rule of the communism tenets, the state and its stewards may window-dress their relationship in order to prevent public criticism. They may appease the public by setting relatively higher compensation for some easily observable managerial traits, such as degrees from prestigious universities or academic scholarship. These factors contribute to one's prestige in China which has a long history and tradition (Confucianism) of respecting knowledge and intellectuals. Moreover, in the light of China's lagging intellectual and educational development in the modern history (the past 60 years), Chinese hold people who have been educated at foreign top universities or have worked overseas in high esteem.
Obviously, academic and international experience is not just a factor of prestige, it will also increase Chinese executives' abilities to manage state assets and generate more benefits for the state as their responsible stewards. We distinguish between prestige and ability variables by also testing whether experience in specialized fields (technology, finance, accounting) is priced in the manager's remuneration.
We classify the managerial characteristics according to three dimensions: the prestige, ability, and personal dimensions in order to explore which types of characteristics account for higher compensation.
Prestige Nationality, Age (which also proxies for seniority and entrenchment within the firm). Based on our above discussion, we expect that managerial pay significantly positively correlates to a manager's political and prestige dimensions, but less so to ability and personal characteristics. Therefore,
C3b. Managerial compensation is significantly positively related to the manager's 'prestige', mirrored by international work experience, overseas education, or academic background.
The role of internal corporate governance
Our fourth set of conjectures looks into the internal corporate governance mechanisms (mainly the structure of the board) that could regulate managerial compensation. An effective board structure could alleviate moral hazard problems and reduce agency costs (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) . The effectiveness of the board structure (especially in monitoring managers) should be stronger when firms become more market-oriented, and executive compensation could consequently be driven more towards the Western pay-for-performance model.
For China, we question the effectiveness of board structures in relation to regulating managerial compensation. Some studies suggest that as China's corporate governance gradually converges to the Western market-based model, especially since the issuance of the 2002 CSRC Code which requires the presence of more independent directors and the separation of management and supervision. Since then, board structure should play a stronger role in aligning managerial pay to firm performance (e.g., Conyon and He, 2011; . However, the blending of the Anglo-Saxon model and the German model of corporate governance actually dilutes the effectiveness of the independent directors and the supervisory board and duplicates administrative costs. IIF (2006) reports that independent directors have little leeway to influence corporate strategy in China. Furthermore, as is the case with the nomination of managers, directors are also usually selected by the government and many of them have political connections. In this sense, they are also stewards of the state, and share the same interests as ('collude' with) the managers instead of monitoring them.
In this light, setting up modern board structures may just be an example of window dressing, as the boards do not function to effectively monitor managers. For instance, the setting up of compensation and strategy committees is voluntary, and firms do so mainly to appease public investors. The state has little incentive to implement a real corporate governance reform leading to firms' independence from the state. The reforms should therefore be seen as 'window dressing'. We therefore expect not to see any significant relation between board characteristics (such as the ratio of independent directors and the use of board committees) on the one hand, and compensation on the other.
C4a. Managerial compensation is only significantly related to 'window-dressing' features of board structures such as setting up a compensation committee.
Managerial duality whereby the manager is also the chairman of the board, and in some cases, even the secretary of the party committee, is still prevalent in Chinese corporations 9
. In an agency framework, managerial duality creates conflicts of interests as the manager is put in a position where he has to evaluate and monitor his own performance. 10 Given that most managers who hold dual positions in China usually also have significant political stakes and aligned interests with the state as its stewards, it is not likely that they would put their own political fate at risk. Since the 2006 reform, the state has decreased its ownership stakes significantly but still exerts control more through controlling executive employees. The state relies more on appointing (re)liable managers, and such liability becomes particularly important when the manager holds a duality position. Therefore, managerial duality should be more positively related to managerial compensation in the post-2006 period. We conjecture that:
C4b. Managerial compensation in China is less related to managerial duality in the pre-2006 period,
but subsequently becomes more positively significantly related to managerial duality.
Link with local political achievements
Our final conjecture deals with the macroeconomic determinants of managerial compensation, as the political dimension is based on issues beyond the individual and firm level. The organizing principles 9 A good example of this managerial duality is the General Manager of PetroChina Jiang Jiemin, who served as the Deputy Provincial Governor of the Qinghai Province and the deputy secretary of the province during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . He has been the General Manager of CNPC, the chairman, the president and the party secretary of PetroChina all at the same time, and he is also an alternate member of the 17th CPC Central Committee. However, Jiang's compensation was not high: according to Reuters, Jiang's 2010 compensation was only RMB 916,000 yuan (approximately $140,000). 10 For example, Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) provide empirical evidence that managerial duality is associated with significantly higher managerial compensation.
of the state require that firms' business activities should be fundamentally state-driven, and be conform to the ideological requirements. Macroeconomic performance at the regional level is an important political indicator of how well local politicians are doing in terms of reaching the political goals of the state and the government(s). Following this logic, our state-stewardship theory argues that managerial compensation also reflects those political goals (in Chinese: Zheng Ji). We focus on three major political/economic goals that the Chinese government cares about most: GDP growth, employment, and inward foreign direct investment. More precisely, as the executives in the local state-controlled firms are usually selected by the local provincial officers who control huge amounts of resources and enjoy broad autonomies (Xu, 2011), or have closer connections and aligned interests with the local government, their compensation should be positively correlated with the local provincial GDP growth and employment.
To test the link between managerial compensation and macroeconomic factors, we use the gross domestic product (GDP), the total employment of the local province where the firm is headquartered, and the number of employees hired by the firm, as measures of how the managers as state's stewards fulfill the local governors' political aims. Prior to 2006, inward FDI (attracting foreign capital and obtaining technological knowhow) was emphasized in the national economic strategy, but subsequently GDP growth was stressed, also as a consequence of the global economic crisis. It should be noted that the political priorities differ across regions, for instance, the eastern coastal provinces with their high level of economic development versus the inner continental provinces (northern and western regions) with lower level of development. The more developed regions have been the engines of China's economic growth, and there the local governors' priorities hinge on GDP growth, whereas in less developed regions, attracting foreign direct investment to upgrade the industrial structure is the focus.
Therefore we conjecture that,
C5. Managerial compensation is positively related to the local macroeconomic (political) achievement indicators such as growth in GDP, inward FDI, and corporate employment.
We control for province-fixed-effects to capture those unobserved macroeconomic factors such as local income, local property prices, local population growth, social safety net, as well as other geographical and demographical factors.
V. Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data
We test our conjectures on firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges 11 . We collect our 11 We exclude Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong or abroad as they operate in a different institutional environment and are subject to different regulations. Table 2 summarizes the variable definitions, Table 3 exhibits the summary statistics on the main variables, and Table 4 comprises of the correlation matrix.
[Insert Tables 2-4 about Here]
Methodology
We estimate the determinants of managerial pay using fixed effects models as the Hausman tests suggest this estimation techniques given that the covariates are not uncorrelated with the unobserved firm effects. As some of key independent variables are time-invariant (e.g. managers' personal background), we also estimate random effect models. The dependent variable is top managerial pay, which is defined as the logarithm of the total compensation of the top three highest-paid top managers as there is no transparency requirement at the individual manager or director level. Our independent variables comprise firm performance (ROA, Tobin's Q), macro-economic factors (the natural logarithm of the local province's annual GDP, of the annual inward foreign direct investment, and of corporate employment 13 ), state-ownership and state-control (shares owned by the state, and the dummy variable indicating whether the ultimate controller of the firm is the state), board structure (independent director ratio, the existence of a compensation committee and of a strategy committee, CEO-chairman duality, top management team size, board size), political connections, managerial backgrounds (education, international experience) and ability (specialized experience). We control for industry, year and province fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level to further adjust for correlation of unobserved characteristics across firms.
Endogeneity is potentially an issue as there may be reverse causality between managerial pay and firm performance. Such endogeneity problems may be especially severe in a Western context where managers receive a significant amount of their total compensation in the form of stock options or restricted stock, and it's hard to unbundle the short-term and long-term financial incentives. However, this is much less of a concern in the case of China because equity-based compensation is rare, and executive compensation packages are produced bureaucratically, with weak links to share price (Buck, Liu, and Skovoroda, 2008) . There has been no tradition of (marked-oriented) pay-for-performance for individual executives owing to the Chinese national culture with high collectivism and high power-distance tolerance. We still address this endogeneity issue by implementing an instrument variable approach as a robustness check on our results.
VI. Results and Discussion
Benchmark results
It is important not just to test the state-stewardship for the whole sample period but to distinguish between the periods before and after the regulatory structural break of 2006 (the split-share reform) and study the economic transition patterns. To examine the impact of the state on top managerial compensation, we estimate the regression including the degree of state-ownership and of state control, Provincial Economic Performance predictors (Ln(Local GDP) and Ln(Inward FDI)) 14 (for definitions, see Table 2 ). A first important observation is that state ownership has a significantly negative impact on managerial pay for the full sample (full sample in Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that high other receivables represent inter-company loans to firms of blockholders. As the use of this type of loans has been shown to be an aspect of tunneling, managers of firms with high other receivables are suspected of self-dealing and hence may care less about their regular cash income. Other receivables are always significantly negative in Table 5 (for the full and pre-2006 samples), which supports conjecture C1b and indicates that gray income and cash compensation are to some extent substitutes. The fact that the negative relation is not statistically significant in the more recent years implies that tunneling by managers (along with dominant shareholders) is no longer (or less) prevalent and that the government crackdown on this type of self-dealing has been successful (and/or that other channels have been found for tunneling).
We document a strong relation between firm performance and managerial compensation (Table 5) .
For the full sample, the economic significance of the coefficient of ROA ( Next, we relate the top managers' 'prestige', which is captured by their international work experience, overseas education, educational level, academic background, to their remuneration. We find that international work experience is rewarded (and even increasingly so), certainly for reasons of prestige in the home country, but possibly also because this type of experience may bring valuable expertise to the company. It should be noted that since Chinese firms turned more market-oriented, international exposure is rewarded more 16 (Table 5 ) but top management's specialized expertise in finance, accounting, or technology is not priced. We also observe that managers with a higher level of education, overseas education, or an academic (university) background receive higher pay. From a human capital view, specialized expertise, international experience, and education could all contribute to managers'
competence, but in China, only those factors with a strong connotation to prestige are priced in 15 We generate a dummy variable indicating whether the observation belongs to the post-2006 sample (or not), and an interaction term between this dummy variable and the "manager political" variable. We then test whether the coefficients of these variables are jointly zero. The F-test rejects the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero, implying the coefficients of "manager political" in the pre-2006 and post-2006 samples are statistically significantly different. 16 An F-test on difference in impact of manager's political experience across sample subperiods is statistically different.
managerial remuneration. This result gives some support our C3b, and is reinforced by Chinese culture in which prestige factors play a prominent role. As managerial pay is strongly related to prestige factors, but less to ability factors, one could call the Chinese remuneration policy as a window-dressing corporate governance practice with as aim to cherry pick managers who are loyal to the state. We also control for age, which is strongly positively related to compensation, and gender which has a negative (but not statistically significant) impact.
Regarding the internal corporate governance structure, we find that the proportion of independent directors does not have an impact on compensation implying that independent directors are not effective in regulating managerial pay. The larger the size of the board and of the management team (which is not part of the board see Figure 2 and has a low correlation with board size), the higher the pay of the top management. The fact that managerial pay is higher in firms with a compensation committee than in firms with a strategy committee supports conjecture 4a. In addition, managerial duality did not significantly influence managerial compensation prior to 2006, but gained significant influence subsequently. This is consistent with our prediction in C4b as the state appoints more (re)liable or trusted people whom they give more responsibilities and thus compensate better.
Furthermore, we show that the number of employees of the firm (Ln(Employees)), which proxies for structure and obtain technological knowhow was a major political concern, but since 2006, the stronger market-orientation and widespread financial crisis put more pressure on the state and local governors to boost economic growth so as to maintain legitimacy and political stability. Table 5 also shows that securing employment has gained importance, especially since the economic crisis struck. This supports conjecture 5: managerial compensation is tied to macroeconomic political achievement indicators.
We do not find the typical pay-performance relationship documented in some other papers, such as Conyon and He (2011 ), Chen et al. (2011 . One key distinction between our model and theirs is that we control for the political dimension such as state ownership, state control, managers' political connections, political achievement variables, etc. We argue that ignoring the strong state involvement could bias the empirical findings and reduce the ability to judge how Chinese managers 17 Because Ln(GDP) and Ln(Inward FDI) are highly correlated (over 80%), we do not include both variables in the same regression.
are actually evaluated. Furthermore, given the large heterogeneity in industrial and regional development within China's economy, what is missing in previous studies are industry and province fixed effects.
[Insert Table 5 about Here]
State-owned enterprises versus private firms
In the previous section, we have found that contrary to the predictions of agency theory, managerial compensation is negatively related to state ownership/control and other receivables, positively related to managers' prestige factors and local governors' political achievements, and not related to shareholder values (e.g., Tobin's Q), managers' ability, and board structure (with exception of the compensation committee which can be regarded as a 'window dressing' tool). We expect that the impact of the above explanatory variables differ across firm type, and be stronger for SOEs.
In this section, we analyze two subsamples: SOEs in which the proportion of state-owned shares amounts to more than 25% and 'privately-owned' firms with state ownership below that threshold. We expect that SOEs and private firms generally have different operating objectives and are subject to specific levels of political monitoring. It should be noted that the Chinese definition of a private firm is different from that in western economies: although the average ownership in a Chinese private firm stake can be low, the influence of the party (through the board, party representatives in the company, etc.) is still significant. As a robustness check, we employ an alternative definition for SOEs, namely these are firms in which the state is the ultimate controlling owner (see Table 2 ). in East China which is the most economically developed and market-oriented region, the influence of state ownership is insignificant (model (1) in Table 7 ). This is not unexpected because those regional economies are more market-oriented and internationally-positioned; the East China region consists of mostly coastal provinces which opened their ports to foreign trade already more than one century ago).
In the North, West, or Northwest regions (models (3), (4), and (6)), state influence is much stronger than in the South (model (2)) or Southwest (model (7)), which can be explained by the fact that these regions were historically considered as strategically located. Most of the ancient imperial capitals were established in these regions (for example, Xi'an, the capital city of Shaanxi Province, was the capital for six imperial dynasties) and they are now the key places in which the state is implementing the pervasive 'Western state ownership does not have a significant impact on managerial pay, the manager's political background variable has a significant effect. This confirms our argument that state-ownership and state-stewardship are substitutes for the state to maintain control over the firms.
[Insert Table 7 about Here]
Robustness Checks
Results from alternative panel data models
To test the robustness of our results, we conduct some more empirical tests with different specifications.
Our afore-mentioned results are based on a random effect model controlling for year, industry, and province fixed effects. As alternative estimation methods, we use pooled OLS models (while controlling for year, industry and province), pure random effect models (without controlling for year, industry and province effects), and fixed effect models (controlling for firm fixed effects). Obviously, the non-time-variant variables yield no results in a firm-fixed effects model. The first three columns in Table   8 report that the coefficients on the state ownership variable are significantly negative and the coefficients on the politically-connected managers are significantly positive, which fails to reject our state-stewardship conjectures. Other receivables have a significant negative relationship with managerial pay, in line with conjecture C3; and the pay for performance (ROA and Tobin's Q) is positively significant. The coefficients on independent directors are again not significant when we control for year, industry, and province fixed effects, but are significant when we use the purely random effect model. We argue that the insignificance of the results with fixed effects models make more sense than the results from purely random effect models: given the large heterogeneity among different industries and regions, we need to control for provincial and industrial variation by including their fixed effects. The same arguments apply to the sign and significance of compensation committee and strategy committee -again, we find that the compensation committee is set up as a mere symbolic feature of the board. The results of the managerial characteristics remain as before; prestige factors are positively and significantly influencing managerial pay whereas the variables capturing ability are not.
Pay and performance revisited: IV strategy
A major problem in many corporate governance studies is the interpretation of the causality in the pay-performance relation: while managerial compensation can be determined by corporate performance, performance is the result of managerial effort and incentives which may hinge on remuneration. Most studies deal with this causation issue by including the one-year lagged value of profitability measures as independent variables. An alternative (and maybe more robust) approach is an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. In the IV approach, an exogenous variable is needed as an instrument which closely relates to the firm performance measure but does not directly influence the managerial pay. A valid IV should be correlated with the endogenous regressor (performance measure) but orthogonal to any other omitted characteristics (i.e., uncorrelated with the outcomes of interest through any channel other than their effect via the endogenous performance variable). One should search for a good instrument at the firm-, industry-or regional-level financial and economic factors as they are most relevant to performance.
However, one major difficulty is that almost all these variables are formal economic factors, are significantly affected by the state's political influence, and are thus correlated with managerial pay through those channels. Therefore, we turn to informal and individual-level factors. The Chinese unique social and cultural background gives us a plausible IV: the interlocking network of directors among Chinese firms.
A key issue of Chinese business is the extensive use of personal connections (in Chinese, Guanxi) and network strategies (Ren et al., 2009) . Such connections and networks are part of the informal institutions that also influence business activities and economic development. Informal institutions are developed to reduce the costs of social interactions when formal institutions such as property rights and contracting institutions are neither well-established nor trusted (North, 1990) . This is especially true in the case of China where the legal infrastructure and law enforcement are weak. Drawing on the social network literature, we know that a firm does not act autonomously but its behavior is influenced by other firms in the social networks (Davis and Greve, 1997; Granovetter, 1985) . The structural position of a firm in its social network therefore influences its performance. Director interlocks are an important form of such network ties that can shape firm behavior and hence performance (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011) .
Such a professional network may give access to information within the network (Davis, 1991) and enables network members to handle uncertainties better (Shropshire, 2010; Shipilov, Greve, and Rowley, 2010) . However, in the Chinese context, we expect interlocked director networks to have little direct impact on managerial compensation, because as managers are not directors and usually (in contrast to the directors) do not own an equity stake. Director networks in China are developed because of (past) informal and political connections (Ren et al., 2009 ) but are not the result of current and past firm performance. Therefore, director network variables could very well serve as valid IVs for firm performance in the managerial compensation model because director networks could directly influence firm performance and are not directly related to managers' compensation.
A network based on director interlocks can be represented by the information centrality which measures the position of the firm within the network and is based on the 'information' contained in all possible geodesic paths between pairs of nodes (firms). The centrality measurement method assumes that each link in a network path is independent, with the variance of a single link between nodes being unity. Therefore, the variance of a path is simply its length. This measure captures communication in corporate interlocks that occurs along reachable, non-geodetic pathways (Stephenson and Zelen, 1989: 3). 22 We estimate the information centrality of a vertex i (firm i) as the harmonic mean of all the information measures between i and all other vertices in the network, and the information measure between two vertices i and j is the inverse of the variance of the weighted function 23 . We then use it to run a 2SLS regression, controlling for the same variables as in the regressions explained in sections 6.1 to 6.3, except that we exclude the five control variables, because these financial performance measures may be highly influenced by information centrality as well 24 . The last two columns of Table 8 ownership. This could be due to the fact that the effects of information centrality are captured by various fixed effects, because a director network can exist within the same province or industry but can also extend across different provinces or industries. In unreported regressions (random effects and pooled OLS) we do indeed find that the coefficients of state-ownership are consistently negative at above the 5% significance level when not controlling for various fixed effects. Therefore most of our five conjectures are still receiving support in the IV estimations. In addition, since the IV results are not significantly different from our basic results, this implies that the endogeneity problem may not be that severe in our basic specifications.
[Insert Table 8 about Here]
In sum, the empirical evidence so far largely confirms our five sets of conjectures developed under 22 We calculate this information centrality measure using software Ucinet 6 as in Borgatti, Evereff, and Freeman (2002) . 23 The information centrality is therefore calculated asIi ൌ ∑ ଵ/ூ ೕసభ , where I, refers to the centrality or information of (i), the harmonic average of the information associated with the path from (i) to the other points.
the state-stewardship framework.
VII. Conclusion
This paper proposes a state-stewardship theory as a competing theory for the agency framework to explain China's state-manager relationship, as well as the corporate governance model and executive compensation schemes which are under the political influence of the state. As the world's largest country transiting from a fully state-controlled economy to a market-oriented one through partial privatizations of firms, China offers the right context to test this theory. We conjecture that Chinese executives act as responsible stewards of the state and run their companies in such a way that the firm objectives are aligned with those of the state. Consequently, managers' compensation schemes are set to reflect their loyalty to the state and abilities to fulfill both the political objectives and the economic targets, with the political ones dominating. Since the 2006 reforms, the state influence has transited from state ownership to state-stewardship. Our state-stewardship framework hinges on five sets of testable conjectures. We use firm-level micro data for almost all public non-financial listed firms for the period 2001 to 2011, as well as regional-level macro data to test our conjectures. The empirical results reveal that Chinese managers are paid much less than their international counterparts. The lower is the remuneration, the more shares the state owns (or the stronger is the ultimate control of the state). Also, the management seems to be remunerated not for maximizing the value of the shareholders but that of the state-owned assets. In addition, the percentage of independent directors on the board and the abandonment of CEO-chairman duality only seems to be used for reasons of window dressing and only has a symbolic nature. Furthermore, remuneration is not linked to ability or personality, but to political connections and prestige, as well as to local officials' political goals and achievements. These effects are stronger in the pre-2006 period because subsequent to the split-share reform, companies became more market-oriented.
The results are robust after controlling for endogeneity, measurement errors, outlier effects, and distinguishing between state and private sectors and among the different regions.
Our empirical results lead to a critical evaluation of the relationships among the state, the firm, and the manager. Whereas most academic studies apply the western agency theory on China's corporate governance and executive compensation, we propose a state-stewardship theory and argue that the state is actually seized by and represents the interest of the ruling government and its politicians, rather than that of the citizens, as argued by North's (1990) predatory theory of the state and the seminal work by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) . Note that our basic argument is that Chinese managers are the stewards of the state, but not necessarily of the nation -the private citizens. Given so, the motivation of the manager would be substantially different. The threat to political and social order calls for a hierarchical social structure, which distributes rents according to individuals' social status (as shown by our 'tunneling' variable). The hierarchy is used by the privileged class to pursue their interests at the cost of society.
As China has been a communist country with a single ruling party for decades, the ideas of socialism still have a strong impact on how companies are run. This is enhanced by the fact that many managers are politically appointed and that there is a party secretary in each firm in parallel to the board of directors to strengthen the political and ideological alignment. As a powerful social elite, the state-steward managers in China -and possibly in other economies with institutional settings similar to China's -have the same interests as the state (the government), namely extracting rents from the whole society. Therefore the term state should be distinguished from the nation which stands for the collective private citizens. The normative justifications of our state-stewardship theory are also offered on a welfare ground. We argue that the main agency problems exist between the general public (the private citizens) who are supposed to be the ultimate shareholders, and the state (along with its steward elites), instead of between the managers and the state. The state and its steward-managers in China form the same interest group and expropriate the private sector and the citizens. The legitimacy of their privileged rights over private sectors is central to our question. State Control This dummy variable equals one if the ultimate controlling shareholder of the firm is the state or a government agency, and zero otherwise. The ultimate controlling shareholder is defined as the largest shareholder (in terms of the number of shares held), or the shareholder whose voting rights exceed those of the largest shareholder (in terms of voting and non-voting shares), or the shareholder who holds more than 30% of cash flow and voting rights, or who can determine the nomination of more than half of the directors through exerting voting rights. The definition of ultimate controller is similar as in the papers by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) and Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2000) . Source: CCER database and CSMAR.
Self-dealing and Gray Income:
Other Receivables Other receivables as on the balance sheet
Firm Performance:
ROA Annual return on assets of the company. Source: WIND.
Tobin's Q The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity. Source: WIND.
Managerial Expertise, Background and Education:
Political Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager is or was an official in the central government, local government, or the military, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
International Work Experience
This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked or is working in a foreign multinational firm, a foreign joint venture, an overseas subsidiary of a Chinese company, or has worked abroad (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Overseas Education
This dummy variable equals one if the manager was educated or obtained a degree abroad, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Accounting Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in an accounting firm or position before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Financial Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in the financial industry before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Technology Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in a technology-related firm or position before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Academic Experience This dummy variable equals one if the manager has worked in academia as a university professor or researcher before, and zero otherwise. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Gender
This dummy variable equals one if the manager is female, and zero if he is male. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Foreign Nationality The dummy variable equals one if the manager is non-Chinese, and zero if Chinese. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Education Level
The score ranges from 0 to 4: zero if his highest education level is below junior college; one in case of junior college; two in case of a bachelor degree; three if the manager has graduated with a master's degree; and four if graduated with a doctoral degree. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Age
The manager's age in the year reported. Source: manually collected from managers' CVs.
Internal Corporate Governance:
Independent Director Ratio
This ratio is the number the independent directors divided by the total number of directors. Source: CSMAR.
Board Size
Total number of the company's board members. Source: CSMAR.
Management Team Size
Total number of the company's total management team members. Source: CSMAR.
Compensation Committee
This dummy variable equals one if the company has a compensation committee, and zero otherwise. Source: CSMAR.
Strategy Committee This dummy variable equals one if the company has a strategy committee, and zero otherwise. Source: CSMAR.
Managerial Duality This dummy variable equals one if the positions of the general manager (president) and chairman are held by the same person, and zero otherwise. Source: CSMAR.
Director Interlocks Number of independent directors who are holding director positions in other listed firms in the year under consideration. Source: manually collected from independent directors' CVs.
Information Centrality
The relative position of a firm within its social network (calculated based on the geodesic paths between any pair of firm-nodes -by means of Ucinet 6)
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance:
Ln(Local GDP) The natural logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the province where the firm is headquartered. Source: NBS (unit: 10,000 million RMB)
The natural logarithm of the flow of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) of the local province where the firm is headquartered. Source: China Statistical Yearbook (unit: USD10,000)
Ln(Employees) The natural logarithm of the total number of people employed by the firm. Source: WIND
Control Variables:
Leverage The ratio of the book value of total debts to the book value of total assets. Source: WIND Sales Growth Annual sales growth rate of the company. Source: WIND
Firm Size
The natural logarithm of the total book assets value of the company. Source: WIND
Capital Intensity
The ratio of capital expenditure to net sales. Source: WIND Ownership Concentration Percentage of total shares owned by the five largest blockholders of the firm Table 5 .
Test for State-Stewardship Theory on Managers
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers' compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), a state control dummy, ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin's Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , Independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province's GDP and inward FDI, and of the total number of employees of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, firm size (total asset value), and the ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 1 . *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. GLS estimations are used.
Full sample
Pre Table 7 . Regional subsamples (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers' compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), a state control dummy, ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin's Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , Independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province's GDP and inward FDI, and of total number of employees of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, firm size (total asset value), and the ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 1 . *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level but not reported so as to save space. GLS estimations are used.
(1) East (2) South (3) West (4) North China (5) North (6) Northwest 
Firm Employment and Provincial Economic Performance:
Ln ( The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the top 3 highest paid managers' compensation. Independent variables are state ownership (%), a state control dummy, ROA (winsorized at the 95% level), Tobin's Q (winsorized at the 95% level) , Independent director ratio , board size, management team size, compensation committee dummy, strategy committee dummy, managerial duality dummy (equals 1 if the manager and chairman is the same person), logarithm of local province's GDP and inward FDI, and of total number of employees of the firm, a series of managerial background dummies, and control variables (leverage, sales growth rate, capital intensity, firm size (total asset value), and the ownership concentration of the top 5 blockholders. More information on variable definitions can be found in Table 1 . *, **, and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Standard errors are robust or clustered at the firm level (for panel data estimations) and reported in parentheses (except for the 2SLS estimation). The standard errors for the second stage of 2SLS estimation are after adjustment. GLS estimations are used for all specifications.
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